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Equal Protection: Why the HPV Vaccine Should be 
Mandated for Both Boys and Girls 
Elizabeth J. Chen
*
 
Human papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually 
transmitted disease in the United States.
1
 If left untreated, it can cause 
cervical, penile, anal, mouth, and throat cancers, as well as genital 
warts.
2
 The new HPV vaccines eliminate two of the most common 
strains of the virus, which are known to cause 70% of cervical 
cancers.
3
 Cervical cancer is unique to women and the second most 
lethal form of cancer among women worldwide.
4
 The disease 
disproportionately affects those in poverty
5
 and results in higher rates 
of cancer in Black and Hispanic women.
6
 Given the rates of cervical 
cancer and the effectiveness of the vaccine, some states now require 
 
 * J.D. Candidate (2012), Washington University School of Law; A.B., University of 
Chicago. This Note was selected as the second place paper in Law Students for Reproductive 
Justice‘s 2011 Sarah Weddington Writing Prize for New Student Scholarship in Reproductive 
Rights. Many thanks to Professor Laura Rosenbury, Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, 
Professor Deborah Dinner, Carolyn Aiken, Elizabeth Dillon, and Jane Kim for their guidance, 
support, and unflagging encouragement. 
 1. HPV-Associated Cancers Statistics, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/hpv/statistics/ (last updated Aug. 23, 2011). 
 2. Id.  
 3. The strains are HPV16 and HPV18. See D. Maxwell Parkin & Freddie Bray, Chapter 
2: The Burden of HPV-related Cancers, 24 VACCINE S11, S17 tbl.1 (Supp. III 2006) (finding 
that 344,900 of 429,800 instances of cervical cancers are attributable to HPV16 and HPV18).  
 4. See Douglas R. Lowy & John T. Schiller, Prophylactic Human Papillomavirus 
Vaccines, 116 J. CLINICAL INVESTIGATION 1167, 1167 (2006). Cervical cancer is unique to 
women because only women have cervixes, and thus only women can be affected by it. The 
HPV vaccine is unique because it is only the second vaccine able to eradicate viruses that cause 
cancer. The first cancer prevention vaccine was developed in 1981 and prevents hepatitis B, a 
virus that can lead to liver cancer. Nat‘l Cancer Inst., Cancer Vaccines, U.S. NAT‘L INST. 
HEALTH, http://www.cancer.gov/cancertopics/factsheet/Therapy/cancer-vaccines (last updated 
Nov. 15, 2011). 
 5. Vicki B. Benard et al., Examining the Association Between Socioeconomic Status and 
Potential Human Papillomavirus-associated Cancers, 113 CANCER 2910, 2913 tbl.1 (Supp. 
2008).  
 6. Meg Watson et al., Burden of Cervical Cancer in the United States, 113 CANCER 
2855, 2857 tbl.2 (Supp. X 2008).  
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female students in public schools to receive vaccination for HPV by 
the sixth grade. While public schools have long played a role in 
public health initiatives by requiring students to receive vaccination 
at a number of different junctures before permitting them to enroll in 
classes,
7
 the introduction of the HPV vaccine has brought new 
controversy to the debate surrounding mandatory vaccination.
8
 Many 
parents and commentators fear that the requirement implicitly 
condones sex before marriage or sex with multiple partners.
9
  
Those concerns have placed the vaccine under increased scrutiny 
in light of the 2012 Republican presidential primary contests. Texas 
Governor Rick Perry signed one of the first laws requiring mandatory 
vaccination of girls.
10
 During the CNN-Tea Party Republican 
presidential debate on September 13, 2011, that mandate came under 
 
 7. See generally James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination 
Requirements: Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831 (2002). States force 
public schools to require vaccination for a variety of reasons, including reducing transmission 
of communicable diseases between students who are in close proximity for extended periods of 
time. This permits the state to ensure that compliance with public health preventive measures is 
high as the vast majority of children take part in public education. See, e.g., id. at 869–73 tbl.2, 
879–82 (including table with vaccine mandates by state; summarizing studies showing that for 
the most part school vaccinations have reduced disease and met their public health aims); James 
C. King, Jr. et al., Effectiveness of School-Based Influenza Vaccination, 355 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
2523 (2006) (―school-based vaccination intervention resulted in a reduction in influenza-related 
outcomes in household members of children attending intervention schools‖); Ctrs. for Disease 
Control & Prevention, Measles and School Immunization Requirements—United States, 1978, 
27 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 303 (1978) (finding that states that strictly enforced 
vaccination laws had 50% lower incidence of measles than those that did not enforce 
vaccination laws strictly). 
 8. The debate ranges in perspectives from those who vehemently oppose vaccination to 
those that vigorously advocate for it. Vaccine advocates highlight the fact that the rate of fully 
vaccinated school-age children in the United States is as high or higher than that in most other 
developed countries, leading to significant decline of common childhood illnesses in the United 
States. Those who oppose vaccination do so for a variety of reasons, including: doubts about 
efficacy of the vaccines and their necessity, fears of adverse effects, and desire to retain 
autonomy for parents to make medical decisions for their children. See Hodge & Gostin, supra 
note 7, at 875–89.  
 9. Physicians such as Dr. Mary Anne Jackson have stated, ―This vaccine has been 
portrayed as ‗the sex vaccine‘ . . . Talking about sexuality for pediatricians and other providers 
is often difficult.‖ Denise Grady, Remark on HPV Vaccine Could Ripple for Years, NY TIMES, 
Sept. 20, 2011, at D1; see also Meghan O‘Rourke, Cancer Sluts: Does the HPV Vaccine 
“Promote” Promiscuity?, SLATE.COM (Sept. 27, 2007), http://www.slate.com/id/ 2174850/; 
Nancy Gibbs, Defusing the War Over the “Promiscuity” Vaccine, TIME, June 21, 2006, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1206813,00.html.  
 10. See infra Part I.B.2.  
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fire when candidate Michele Bachmann erroneously claimed that the 
vaccine was ―dangerous.‖11 She then suggested that the vaccine 
causes ―mental retardation.‖12 Medical experts from the American 
Academy of Pediatrics immediately rebuffed her statements, but 
physicians fear that the damage is done, and vaccination rates will 
drop.
13
  
Generally left out of the debate is the fact that men transmit the 
vast majority of HPV infections both to women and other men,
14
 yet 
states require vaccination only for girls. Indeed, studies report ―more 
than half of American men will get HPV infections at some point in 
their lives.‖15 Additionally, 30% of the cancers caused by HPV affect 
men, including penile and anal cancers.
16
 By requiring vaccination of 
girls only, states are both inefficiently curtailing transmission to 
women and inadequately protecting men from the effects of the virus.  
Beyond harming individual women and men, a sex-specific 
vaccination mandate raises an important equal protection concern. 
Legal scholars have considered the constitutionality of the HPV 
vaccine in varied contexts, including whether it is constitutional to 
require immigrants to receive vaccination prior to entering the 
country and whether it is constitutional to use the school context to 
mandate a vaccine that eliminates a sexually transmitted infection. A 
few scholars have also considered whether a sex-specific HPV 
vaccination requirement violates the privacy and liberty interests of 
girls and their parents. This Note, in contrast, considers whether 
gendered mandates can withstand constitutional scrutiny under equal 
protection analysis and in the process examines the legal and public 
health implications of mandating HPV vaccination for women only.  
 
 11. CNN-Tea Party Republican Debate in Tampa, Fla., NY TIMES (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/13/us/politics/cnn-tea-party-republican-debate-in-tampa-
fla.html (providing transcript of debate); see also Grady, supra note 9.  
 12. See Scott Hensley, Pediatricians Fact-Check Bachmann’s Bashing of HPV Vaccine, 
SHOTS: NPR‘S HEALTH BLOG (Sept. 13, 2011, 5:54 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/ 
2011/09/13/140445104/pediatricians-fact-check-bachmanns-bashing-of-hpv-vaccine.  
 13. See Grady, supra note 9.  
 14. Ann N. Burchell et al., Chapter 6: Epidemiology and Transmission Dynamics of 
Genital HPV Infection, 24 VACCINE S52, S57–S58 (Supp. III 2006). 
 15. SHOBHA S. KRISHNAN, THE HPV VACCINE CONTROVERSY: SEX, CANCER, GOD, AND 
POLITICS: A GUIDE FOR PARENTS, WOMEN, MEN AND TEENAGERS 118 (2008).  
 16. HPV-Associated Cancer Statistics, supra note 1.  
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States violate the equal protection guarantee when they fail to 
include boys in HPV vaccination mandates. A girls-only requirement 
is based on false, gendered, heteronormative stereotypes and 
assumptions, which presume that women alone are responsible for 
limiting or eradicating HPV transmission and contraction. States are 
taking the wrong approach to eliminating HPV and its adverse effects 
on society because they have chosen an under-inclusive method to 
eliminate HPV. By requiring the vaccine for girls alone, states will 
not achieve their public health goal of eliminating the virus that 
causes cervical cancer and will continue to perpetuate inequality 
through sex stereotypes. To address HPV in a more closely tailored 
manner, states should confront the virus from all available angles, 
including mandating it for boys.  
Part I examines HPV and its vaccine, existing and proposed 
mandates, and the legal frameworks for assessing HPV vaccine 
mandates. Part II applies the framework of equal protection 
jurisprudence to examine whether gendered vaccination mandates 
withstand intermediate scrutiny. Part II also examines the public 
health impact of gendered mandates as compared to proposed gender-
neutral mandates. Finally, Part III proposes suggestions for 
implementing gender-neutral mandates, methods for remedying the 
sex discrimination inherent in the existing mandates, and ideas for 
addressing inequality more broadly through the HPV vaccine.  
I. BACKGROUND & HISTORY OF THE VACCINE MANDATES 
A. Human Papillomavirus and Gardasil 
Human Papillomavirus (HPV) is the most common sexually 
transmitted infection in the United States.
17
 HPV is transmitted 
through skin contact.
18
 At least half of sexually active men and 
 
 17. See generally Willard Cates, Jr., Estimates of the Incidence and Prevalence of 
Sexually Transmitted Diseases in the United States, 26 SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED DISEASES S2 
(1999); Eileen F. Dunne et al., Prevalence of HPV Infection Among Females in the United 
States, 297 JAMA 813 (2007).  
 18. ADINA NACK, DAMAGED GOODS: WOMEN LIVING WITH INCURABLE SEXUALLY 
TRANSMITTED DISEASES 3 (2008). Because the virus is transmitted through skin contact, the 
use of latex condoms is only partially effective at preventing its transmission because genital 
contact can occur beyond the surface area covered by condoms. See KRISHNAN, supra note 15, 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/9
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women will contract HPV during the course of their lifetimes.
19
 The 
virus can cause cervical and vaginal cancer in women,
20
 mouth and 
throat cancers and genital warts in men and women,
21
 and penile and 
anal cancers in men.
22
 A study covering over 80% of the United 
States population estimated that 24,900 instances of HPV-related 
cancer occur each year; while 70% of HPV-related cancers occur in 
women, the remaining 30% occur in men.
23
 Researchers claim that 
the cancers associated with HPV cost $3.7 billion in 2003 alone, 
based on the number of lives lost from the cancers associated with the 
virus and their years of potential life lost, as well as the overall loss 
of productivity due to the virus and the cancers associated with it.
24
  
HPV disproportionately affects individuals based on race, 
geography, and class. Black and Hispanic women face an increase in 
cervical cancer mortality, and they tend to receive less aggressive 
treatment for cervical cancer as compared to white women,
25
 
following general patterns of uneven distribution of health care 
 
at 119. But see id. at 120 (finding in a meta-analysis of studies that ―condom use reduces HPV 
transmission by 70%‖). 
 19. The Nat‘l Women‘s Health Info. Ctr., Human Papillomavirus (HPV) and Genital 
Warts, WOMENSHEALTH.GOV THE FED. GOV‘T SOURCE FOR WOMEN‘S HEALTH INFO., 
http://womenshealth.gov/faq/human-papillomavirus.cfm (last updated Jan. 1, 2009).  
 20. Studies have found that HPV strains cause 100% of cervical cancers and between 40–
70% of vaginal cancers. See Parkin & Bray, supra note 3, at S17 tbl.1 (providing statistics on 
percentage of cervical cancers caused by HPV); Hugo De Vuyst et al., Prevalence and Type 
Distribution of Human Papillomavirus in Carcinoma and Intraepithelial Neoplasia of the 
Vulva, Vagina and Anus: A Meta-analysis, 124 INT‘L J. CANCER 1626, 1627 (2009) (providing 
statistics on percentage of vaginal cancers caused by HPV). 
 21. HPV-Associated Cancer Statistics, supra note 1 (providing statistics regarding mouth 
and throat cancer). CDC reports that 25% of mouth cancers and 35% of throat cancers are 
caused by HPV. Id. Other studies have found that two of the HPV strains targeted by Gardasil, 
HPV6 and HPV11, cause 90% of genital warts. See Hillard Weinstock et al., Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases Among American Youth: Incidence and Prevalence Estimates, 2000, 36 
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH 6, 8 (2004); Should HPV Vaccines be Mandatory for 
All Adolescents?, 368 LANCET 1212, 1212 (2007) [hereinafter Mandatory HPV Vaccines].  
 22. Studies have found that HPV strains cause between 85–90% of anal cancers and 
around 40% of penile cancers. See Parkin & Bray, supra note 3, at S17 (providing findings for 
penile and anal cancers); De Vuyst et al., supra note 20, at 1627 (providing findings for anal 
cancer). 
 23. HPV-Associated Cancer Statistics, supra note 1.  
 24. See Donatus U. Ekwueme et al., Years of Potential Life Lost and Productivity Costs 
Because of Cancer Mortality and for Specific Cancer Sites Where Human Papillomavirus May 
Be a Risk Factor for Carcinogenesis—United States, 2003, 113 CANCER 2936, 2936 (2008).  
 25. Watson et al., supra note 6, at 2862.  
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services in the United States.
26
 Cervical cancers caused by HPV are 
more prevalent in generally Southern areas, including the District of 
Columbia, Florida, Kentucky, Louisiana, West Virginia, Arkansas, 
and Texas, in addition to Illinois.
27
 Researchers have found that lower 
median income is correlative of lower levels of vaccination.
28
  
Currently, two vaccines target various strains of HPV. Merck 
Pharmaceuticals developed Gardasil, and in 2006, the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) licensed its use for women ages nine to 
twenty-six to prevent four strains of HPV, two of which cause 70% 
of cervical cancers and the other of which cause genital warts.
29
 In 
May 2010, FDA extended its approval for Gardasil to men ages nine 
to twenty-nine,
30
 but only for the treatment of genital warts
31
 and anal 
cancer.
32
 FDA also approved GlaxoSmithKline‘s Cervarix for use by 
women in the same age group.
33
 Cervarix targets the same strains of 
 
 26. Peter B. Bach, Gardasil: From Bench, to Bedside, to Blunder, 375 LANCET 963, 964 
(2010). 
 27. Meg Watson et al., Using Population-based Cancer Registry Data to Assess the 
Burden of Human Papillomavirus-associated Cancers in the United States: Overview of 
Methods, 113 CANCER 2841 (Supp. 2008).  
 28. Id. 
 29. See Lauri E. Markowitz et al., Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine: 
Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 56 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPTS. 1, 1 (2007), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/rr5602a1.htm.  
 30. See FDA Approves New Indication for Gardasil to Prevent Genital Warts in Men and 
Boys, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Oct. 16, 2009), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ 
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm187003.htm; Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
FDA Licensure of Quadrivalent Human Papillomavirus Vaccine (HPV4, Gardasil) for Use in 
Males and Guidance from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 59 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. RPTS. 630 (2010) [hereinafter CDC Report on Men], 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5920a5.htm?s_cid=mm5920 
a5_e. Merck also conducted studies in boys to determine the vaccine‘s efficacy in establishing 
immunity in that population, and ―found a high level of immunity in boys, similar to that found 
in girls.‖ KRISHNAN, supra note 15, at 130. 
 31. See CDC Report on Men, supra note 30.  
 32. See Gardasil Approved to Prevent Anal Cancer, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 
22, 2010), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm237941.htm. 
 33. See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, FDA Licensure of Bivalent Human 
Papillomavirus Vaccine (HPV2, Cervarix) for Use in Females and Updated HPV Vaccination 
Recommendations from the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 69 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 626 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/ 
preview/mmwrhtml/mm5920a4.htm. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/9
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HPV that cause 70% of cervical cancers, but it does not target the 
strains that cause genital warts.
34
  
The Centers for Disease Control & Prevention (CDC) has 
recommended, through its Advisory Committee for Immunization 
Practices (ACIP), that states should mandate vaccination for ―females 
11-12 years‖ with ―catch-up . . . vaccination recommended for 
females ages 13–26 who have not previously been vaccinated.‖35 As 
of October 2011, ACIP has also recommended that boys ages eleven 
and twelve be vaccinated against HPV.
36
 Vaccination is predicted to 
be a highly cost-effective intervention.
37
 Researchers have found a 
correlation between increased vaccination coverage and decreased 
cervical cancer mortality.
38
 
Researchers have also found that the HPV vaccine is effective in 
men to prevent the contraction of the virus by both men and 
women.
39
 The Lancet, a British medical journal, recommends that the 
 
 34. Id.  
 35. See Markowitz et al., supra note 29, at 1. The recommendations target women as 
young as the age of twelve because statistic modeling has shown that it is most cost-effective to 
vaccinate prior to exposure to the virus and prior to commencing sexual activity. See Jane J. 
Kim & Sue J. Goldie, Health and Economic Implications of HPV Vaccination in the United 
States, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 821, 821 (2008). According to news sources, the American 
Academy of Pediatrics, a children‘s health advocacy organization for physicians and 
pediatricians, has added the HPV vaccine to its recommended vaccines for boys. See Lynne 
Peeples, HPV Vaccine Effective in Men, CNN HEALTH (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2011/HEALTH/02/02/hpv.vaccine.men.health/index.html.  
 The ACIP is a group of fifteen vaccine experts selected by the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services to provide advice regarding vaccination for 
preventable diseases. The group provides advice about whether vaccines should be offered and 
mandated through written recommendations, and is the only federal entity to provide such 
advice. Nat‘l Ctr. for Immunization & Respiratory Diseases, Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL VACCINES: 
RECOMMENDATIONS & GUIDELINES, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/recs/acip/default.htm#about 
(last updated Dec. 23, 2011). 
 36. See Gardiner Harris, Panel Endorses HPV Vaccine for Boys of 11, NY TIMES, Oct. 26, 
2011, at A1.  
 37. Gary Michael Ginsberg et al., Screening, Prevention & Treatment of Cervical 
Cancer—A Global and Regional Generalized Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, 27 VACCINE 6060, 
6060 (2009). The authors find that in ―regions of high income, low mortality and high existing 
treatment coverage‖ such as a developed nation like the United States, ―vaccination is the most 
cost-effective intervention.‖ Id.  
 38. Bach, supra note 26, at 963 fig.1.  
 39. Anna R. Giuliano et al., Efficacy of Quadrivalent HPV Vaccine Against HPV Infection 
and Disease in Males, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 401, 409 (2011) (―Our findings point to the 
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HPV vaccine be mandated for both sexes, based on ―[m]odelling 
studies [that] have shown that a female-specific approach would be 
only 60–75% as effective at reducing HPV prevalence in women as 
strategies that target both sexes.‖40 Physicians have also argued that 
―[n]ot only can vaccination of boys and men bolster and expedite 
health benefits in girls and women (i.e., by contributing to reduced 
HPV prevalence among men and therefore reduced transmission to 
their sexual partners), but there is now clear evidence that boys and 
men themselves can benefit directly.‖41  
B. States That Have Mandated Girls’ Vaccination  
for School Enrollment 
States rely heavily on the recommendations of ACIP to inform 
whether they will mandate certain vaccines.
42
 As early as 2007, ACIP 
advised routine HPV vaccination for females aged eleven or twelve 
years and recommended vaccination for females thirteen to twenty-
six years of age.
43
 In 2010, it updated those recommendations to 
include the second version of the vaccine, implying that either 
version of the vaccine could be used to prevent cervical cancer.
44
  
Almost immediately after ACIP released its recommendations, 
legislators and state policymakers began to propose legislation to 
increase education about and funding for the HPV vaccine, as well as 
to mandate it as a condition for girls‘ school entrance.45 None of the 
states that have passed statutes have yet officially considered 
vaccination for boys. Descriptions of state governmental action 
regarding mandated HPV vaccination follow.  
 
efficacy of the quadrivalent HPV vaccine in preventing HPV infection and related diseases in 
men.‖). 
 40. See Mandatory HPV Vaccines, supra note 21. 
 41. Jane J. Kim, Weighing the Benefits and Costs of HPV Vaccination of Young Men, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 393, 394 (2011); see also Harris, supra note 36.  
 42. See supra note 35 for description of ACIP and its function.  
 43. Markowitz et al., supra note 29, at 1 and accompanying text. 
 44. See id.  
 45. HPV Vaccine, NAT‘L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/ 
default.aspx?tabid=14381 (last updated Jan. 2012).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/9
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1. Virginia 
Virginia was the first state to enact a statute requiring girls to be 
vaccinated against HPV before entering the sixth grade.
46
 The statute 
includes provisions permitting parents to opt out of the regime,
47
 
which legislators believed would ensure more compliance and less 
resistance.
48
  
2. Texas  
Texas‘s mandate originated from an executive order in early 
2007.
49
 In the order, the governor, Rick Perry, provided extensive 
 
 46. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-46 (2011). The statute provides, in relevant part:  
A. The parent . . . of each child within this Commonwealth shall cause such child to be 
immunized in accordance with the Immunization Schedule developed and published 
by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Advisory Committee on 
Immunization Practices (ACIP), the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), and the 
American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP). . . . The Board's regulations shall at 
a minimum require: 
. . . . 
 12. Three doses of properly spaced human papillomavirus (HPV) vaccine for 
females. The first dose shall be administered before the child enters the sixth grade. 
Id.  
 47. See id.  
 48. Opt-out provisions add legitimacy to required provisions by ensuring flexibility in 
administration and ensuring that the provision does not seem oppressive or rigid. These 
provisions originally developed to provide those with religious objections the means to continue 
abiding by the law, while also partaking in public education. See generally Emily Buss, The 
Adolescent’s  Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2000) (arguing that if denied an opportunity to opt-out from educational 
policies that they do not agree with, parents may just remove their children from the system 
altogether). But cf. Sylvia Law, Human Papillomavirus Vaccination, Private Choice, and 
Public Health, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1731, 1768–69 (2008) (noting that while the Constitution 
permits states to ―mandate vaccinations without making allowance for religious or 
conscientious objections by parents,‖ states are free to make such allowances at the risk of 
harming the level of vaccination).  
 49. R.P. Exec. Order No. 65 (Tex. Feb. 2, 2007), available at http://governor.state.tx 
.us/news/executive-order/3455/. Relevant portions of the executive order are reproduced below. 
The preamble of the executive order includes the following facts: ―HPV is the most common 
sexually transmitted infection-causing cancer in females in the United States‖ and ―the Texas 
Cancer Registry estimates there were 1,169 new cases and 391 deaths from cervical cancer in 
Texas in 2006.‖ Id. Some relevant provisions from the statute include the mandate itself, and 
also the right for parents to object to vaccination:  
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findings noting death rates from HPV-caused cancers both nationally 
and in Texas, and the efficacy of the vaccine in preventing HPV.
50
 
Like the Virginia law, the governor‘s mandate applied to girls 
entering the sixth grade in public schools and included provisions 
ensuring access to the vaccine, provided funds to increase public 
awareness about the vaccine, and permitted parents to object.
51
 The 
executive order was subsequently overruled by the legislature, which 
revoked the mandate but retained funds for providing educational 
materials about vaccination.
52
 In 2009, the Texas legislature 
considered a bill that would have permitted an agency head to 
mandate HPV immunization, but the bill did not pass.
53
  
 
Rules. The Health and Human Services Executive Commissioner shall adopt rules that 
mandate the age appropriate vaccination of all female children for HPV prior to 
admission to the sixth grade. 
Parents’ Rights. The Department of State Health Services will, in order to protect the 
right of parents to be the final authority on their children‘s health care, modify the 
current process in order to allow parents to submit a request for a conscientious 
objection affidavit form via the Internet while maintaining privacy safeguards under 
current law. 
Id.  
 50. Id.  
 51. Id. 
 52. TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 38.001 (Vernon 2007). The text of the HPV provision is as 
follows:  
 (b-1) Immunization against human papillomavirus is not required for a person's 
admission to any elementary or secondary school; however, by using existing 
resources, the Health and Human Services Commission shall provide educational 
material about the human papillomavirus vaccine. 
Id.  
 53. H.B. 2220, 81st Sess. (Tex. 2009), available at http://www.legis.state.tx.us/tlodocs/ 
81R/billtext/html/HB02220I.htm. The text of the proposed legislation, in relevant part, is as 
follows:  
 (b) [T]he executive commissioner of the Health and Human Services 
Commission . . . may modify or delete any of the immunizations in Subsection (a) or 
may require immunizations against additional diseases as a requirement for admission 
to any elementary or secondary school.   
Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol38/iss1/9
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3. Washington D.C.  
In the District of Columbia, the legislature passed a bill mandating 
the vaccination of girls before sixth-grade school enrollment.
54
 The 
bill includes opt-out provisions for parents, with available objections 
ranging from religious to medical to a general lack of desire.
55
  
4. New York  
Legislation is currently pending in New York to require routine 
immunization against HPV as a condition of school attendance for all 
students born after January 1, 1996.
56
 The New York legislation is 
unique because it speaks in gender-neutral terms, and does not leave 
room for parents to opt-out of vaccination.
57
 As of publication, the 
legislature has not made explicit findings to explain why the 
proposed statute is gender-neutral.  
 
 54. D.C. CODE § 7–1651.04 (2010). The statute states in relevant part:  
(b)(1) By the beginning of the 2009 school year, and of every school year thereafter, 
the parent or legal guardian of a female child enrolling in grade 6 for the first time at a 
school in the District of Columbia shall be required to submit certification: 
 (A) That the child has received the HPV vaccine; or 
 (B) That the child has not received the HPV vaccine because: 
(i) The parent or legal guardian has objected in good faith and in writing to the 
chief official of the school that the vaccination would violate his or her religious 
beliefs; 
(ii) The child's private physician, his or her representative, or the public health 
authority has provided the school written certification that the vaccination is 
medically inadvisable; or 
(iii) The parent or legal guardian, in his or her discretion, has elected to opt out of 
the HPV vaccination program, for any reason, by signing a form prepared by the 
Department of Health that states the parent or legal guardian has been informed of 
the HPV vaccination requirement and has elected not to participate. 
Id. 
 55. Id. § 7-1651.04(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii).  
 56. A. 699, 234th Sess. (N.Y. 2011), available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?default 
_fld=&bn=+A00699%09%09&Summary=Y&Text=Y. The text of the proposed bill is as 
follows: ―Provides for the immunization of all children born after January 1, 1996 with the 
human papillomavirus (HPV).‖ Id. 
 57. See id.  
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Between 2006 and 2010, twenty-one additional states considered 
legislation to mandate the HPV vaccine as a condition of girls‘ public 
school attendance.
58
 As of December 2011, four states, including 
New York, have legislation pending regarding the HPV vaccine.
59
  
C. Existing Legal Frameworks 
1. Prior Scholarship  
a. Constitutionality of the HPV Vaccine, Generally  
Scholarship to date has considered the constitutionality of the 
vaccine as a matter of general vaccination policy, highlighting 
arguments that scientists have not sufficiently studied its effects.
60
 
Scholars such as Sylvia Law have assessed the validity of HPV 
vaccine mandates as ―ethical, political, medical, and constitutional 
issues,‖ and have concluded that they should be adopted.61 Law 
elected not to engage in a constitutional analysis of the gender-based 
nature of the mandates. She did assert, however, on public health 
grounds that states should mandate that boys, as well as girls, receive 
the vaccine to achieve a high level of immunity to HPV in the overall 
population.
62
  
b. Immigration Context  
Some scholarship has considered the constitutionality of the now-
retracted Citizenship and Immigration Services regulation
63
 that 
 
 58. The following states have previously considered passing a mandate: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Missouri, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South 
Carolina, Vermont, West Virginia. See HPV Vaccine, supra note 45.  
 59. See id.  
 60. See, e.g., Micah Globerson, Protecting Women: A Feminist Legal Analysis of the HPV 
Vaccine, Gardasil, 17 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67 (2007); James Colgrove et al., HPV Vaccination 
Mandates—Lawmaking Amid Political & Scientific Controversy, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 785 
(2010). 
 61. Law, supra note 48, at 1732. 
 62. Id. at 1761–62.  
 63. Citizenship & Immigration Services retracted the requirement that permanent resident 
(green card) applicants receive the HPV vaccine when CDC made its criteria more stringent for 
deciding whether vaccination would be required. The constraints include a requirement that the 
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mandated the HPV vaccine for female immigrants as a condition of 
entry into the United States.
64
 The analyses largely concluded that 
such requirements were unconstitutional, against international law, 
and generally ill-advised because the vaccine is untested and is not 
mandated equally for citizens and non-citizens alike.
65
 Because the 
FDA had not yet approved a HPV vaccine for men at the time this 
regulation was promulgated,
66
 mandates for male immigrants are 
largely not discussed in this scholarship.
67
  
 
vaccine either ―protect against a disease that has the potential to cause an outbreak‖ or ―protect 
against a disease that has been eliminated in the United States or is in the process for 
elimination in the United States.‖ This language substantially limits the types of prophylactic 
vaccines that can be mandated. Criteria for Vaccination Requirements for U.S. Immigration 
Purposes, 74 Fed. Reg. 58634 (Nov. 13, 2009) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(1)(A)(ii) (2010)) 
(explaining the change to the statute). CDC addressed the HPV vaccine in the context of 
immigration in greater depth, stating:  
 CDC has applied the criteria and determined that . . . the HPV vaccine will not be 
required for aliens seeking admission as an immigrant. . . . Because HPV infection is 
common in the general US population, is asymptomatic, and because it is not possible 
to distinguish infections which resolve spontaneously from those that result in cervical 
cancer, HPV is not the target of outbreak control. Rather a routine vaccination program 
is recommended to prevent infection . . . . Further, HPV has not been eliminated, nor is 
in the process of elimination, in the United States.  
Id.  
 64. Elizabeth Sheyn has written two articles about HPV vaccine mandates in immigration 
law. She concludes that HPV vaccine mandates contravene the U.N.‘s Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and other international laws designed to protect human rights because they 
discriminate on the basis of gender and nationality, and are not scientifically studied 
substantially enough; her analysis on the sex-discriminatory nature of the mandate is not 
substantial. See Elizabeth R. Sheyn, An Accidental Violation: How Required Gardasil 
Vaccinations for Female Immigrants to the United States Contravene International Law, 88 
NEB. L. REV. 524, 551–59 (2010) [hereinafter Sheyn, International Law]. In addition, Sheyn 
argues that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional for immigrant women on equal protection 
based on nationality grounds and due process grounds. See Elizabeth R. Sheyn, Putting an End 
to an Unconstitutional Result: Equal Protection and Due Process Analyses of the Requirement 
that Female Immigrants Receive the Gardasil Vaccine Prior to Becoming Permanent Residents 
of the United States, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 1 (2009). In addition, a student note suggests that a 
vaccination requirement for immigrants should be better supported with scientific evidence 
prior to mandating it. See Christie V. Canales, Note, HPV Vaccination Requirement for Female 
Immigrants: An Example of Discrimination, 13 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 779 (2010).  
 65. Supra note 64.  
 66. See CDC Report on Men, supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 67. See Sheyn, International Law, supra note 64, at 558 (very briefly concluding that one 
of the grounds on which the immigration mandate contravenes international law is because it is 
applied disparately to women).  
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c. Constitutionality of Mandating Vaccine for Men  
A few law students have discussed the constitutionality of a 
potential HPV vaccine mandate for men. One student uses an 
economic analysis to assert that any HPV vaccine mandate for men 
would be unconstitutional because, in the student‘s view, the costs 
outweigh the benefits.
68
 This analysis is limited in large part because 
it relies significantly on statistics that underestimate both the health 
effects of HPV in men and the extent to which vaccinating men 
would diminish the incidence of HPV in women.
69
 Another student 
briefly examines the constitutionality of the sex-specific vaccine 
mandate in Virginia, concluding that the discriminatory means 
employed fails to meet the intermediate scrutiny burden because, in 
the student‘s view, public health rationales will always be inadequate 
to meet that burden.
70
 Few other scholars have touched on this topic 
at length.
71
  
 
 68. Benjamin Lemke, Note, Why Mandatory Vaccination of Males against HPV is 
Unconstitutional: Offering a New Approach to an Old Problem, 19 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 261, 
280–81 (2010). 
 69. See id. at 280–84. Lemke relies extensively on a formula he develops and dubs the 
―Modified Hand Formula‖ and focuses solely on studies that only address the cancer burdens of 
HPV on women—the only gender affected by existing mandates. He ignores the broader scope 
of those affected by HPV and its transmission, resulting in an artificially high economic burden 
on men to receive vaccination. He makes an assumption—that while one population, women, is 
disproportionately affected by the virus, the one responsible for transmission, men, should have 
no role in preventing transmission. Lemke compares the number of women contracting HPV 
and getting cervical cancer with the number of men contracting HPV and getting anal or penile 
cancers. This comparison has two fundamental flaws: (1) it ignores the fact that vaccinating 
men curtails transmission of the virus to women, and (2) it assumes that cancer in women only 
affects women in society, and that cancer for men only affects men in society. These 
assumptions lead to his calculation of disproportionately high economic burden on men and 
give rise to his conclusion that a mandate for men would be unconstitutional because of the 
discrepancy of costs calculated. Some physicians have argued, however, that because there has 
been relatively low uptake of HPV vaccination among women, vaccinating men and boys 
would in fact be a cost effective way to reach the population more fully. See Kim, supra note 
41, at 394.  
 70. Lindsey Heinz asserts that the Virginia mandate fails intermediate scrutiny because 
the sex discriminatory nature of the provision does not do enough to meet the public health 
objectives of eliminating HPV. Her analysis is relatively conclusory, however, because it 
assumes the Court‘s ruling without further analysis of why it would so rule. Lindsey Heinz, 
Comment, ―Please, Don’t Shot My Daughter!” Is There Legal Support for State-Compelled 
HPV Vaccination Laws? Why Ethical, Moral, and Religious Opposition to These Laws May be 
Jumping the Gun, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 913, 932–34 (2008).  
 71. See Globerson, supra note 60, at 105. Globerson includes a single brief conclusory 
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2. Equal Protection Sex Discrimination Doctrine  
The constitutionality of sex-specific HPV mandates must meet 
equal protection standards developed by the Supreme Court. 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court began recognizing sex 
discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.
72
 The Court developed an intermediate 
scrutiny standard to assess whether states could maintain sex-based 
classifications.
73
 That standard, articulated in Craig v. Boren, 
 
paragraph on this issue, stating that Gardasil could not be mandated for men based on earlier 
arguments regarding women‘s sexuality, and how and why women should be protected. He 
performs a ―switching the parties‖ analysis, similar to the one David A. Strauss creates as a 
framework for analyzing race discrimination. David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the 
Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956–59 (1989). Strauss argues that the key question 
in determining whether a law can withstand constitutional scrutiny is whether the legislature 
would have enacted the same statute were the groups reversed. Id. at 957. Using Strauss‘s 
framework, the key question is whether the mostly male legislature would have passed the HPV 
vaccination statute had the vast majority of those affected by the statute been men. If not, then 
sex discrimination should be considered the but-for cause of the statute. Globerson uses a 
similar analysis to conclude that if the groups for the HPV vaccination mandate were switched, 
that is, if the vaccination program targeted boys instead of girls, Texas‘s HPV vaccination 
mandate would not have elicited the same response because of ―commoditization of female 
sexuality, virginity-oriented abstinence efforts, gendered policies such as military service, the 
lasting conceptualization of woman as temptress, the focus on nominal rather than real gender 
equality, and the battle to restrict women‘s reproductive rights all describ[ing] a prejudice 
specifically directed toward women and girls.‖ Globerson, supra, at 105.  
 72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The text of the Equal Protection Clause is as follows: ―No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction 
the equal protection of the laws.‖ Id. § 1.  
 73. The strict scrutiny standard developed in race discrimination cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause, striking down laws in which the government did not use the least restrictive 
means to accomplish its ends when race-based classifications were used. The Supreme Court 
first articulated the ―strict scrutiny‖ standard in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 
(1944). The standard was developed for assessing whether racial classifications were valid, and 
the Court held that ―all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are 
immediately suspect. . . . [C]ourts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.‖ Korematsu, 
323 U.S. at 216. The Court added in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), that ―if [the 
classifications] are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to the 
accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination 
which it was the object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate.‖ Id. at 11. The development 
of the standard in sex-based classifications was much more convoluted, however, as it evolved 
from a rational basis-like standard to one of intermediate scrutiny during a series of cases. The 
first case to use equal protection to secure sex equality was Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), in 
which the Supreme Court held a sex-based classification unconstitutional, but without reaching 
a heightened scrutiny standard. Next, the Court decided in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1973) (plurality opinion), that a sex-based classification was unconstitutional, but did not 
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required that ―classifications by gender . . . serve important 
governmental objectives and . . . be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives.‖74 In United States v. Virginia 
(VMI), the Virginia Military Institute‘s policy of sex-discriminatory 
admissions practices was challenged under Craig; the Court found 
that to uphold a sex-based classification, the government, in addition 
to meeting the intermediate scrutiny standard, needed to ―establish an 
‗exceedingly persuasive justification‘ for the classification.‖75 
Pursuant to this case law, the judiciary must balance important 
governmental interests in regulating society against the constitutional 
interest of preserving individual rights. The contours of such 
balancing are uncertain; the intermediate scrutiny standard can fall 
anywhere between fatal-in-fact strict scrutiny
76
 and any-rational-
reason rational basis review.
77
  
Several rationales govern the analysis of sex-based classifications. 
The Supreme Court is generally willing to uphold statutes that rely on 
sex-based classifications when the Court sees ―real differences‖ 
 
agree upon a standard of review. Finally, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), the 
Supreme Court created an intermediate scrutiny standard for sex-based classifications. 
 74. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. This case struck down a sex classification that made it lawful 
for women to buy 3.5% beer at age 18, while men could not purchase it until the age of 21, 
treating them differently because of their sex. In invalidating the law, the Supreme Court 
articulated the intermediate scrutiny standard now used in cases involving challenges to sex-
based classifications.  
 75. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996) (quoting Mississippi Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). In VMI, the Supreme Court held that the school‘s 
policy of excluding women was unconstitutional based on the standard quoted in the text. Id.  
 76. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972) (describing the strict 
scrutiny standard as ―‗strict‘ in theory and fatal in fact‖). But see Adam Winkler, Fatal in 
Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 
VAND. L. REV. 793, 796 (2006) (empirically evaluating strict scrutiny and finding that between 
1990 and 2003, 27% of applications of strict scrutiny to race-based classifications survived 
review, and thus arguing that the standard is less fatal than originally believed).  
 77. Rational basis, as defined by the Court in Carolene Products, provides that ―the 
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regulatory 
legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional 
unless in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.‖ United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). 
Most legislation scrutinized under rational basis review survives because the standard of review 
is highly deferential to legislatures.  
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between men and women.
78
 These differences tend to involve 
pregnancy and parentage because of reproductive biology.
79
 Some 
scholars argue against that principle, asserting that real differences do 
not truly exist,
80
 or are fictive means of maintaining hierarchy.
81
 At 
the same time, the Court is unwilling to rely on sex stereotypes to 
justify sex-based classifications.
82
 Scholars have invoked such anti-
stereotyping arguments even in the face of reproductive differences, 
for example by showing how pregnancy stereotyping more generally 
reinforces gender norms.
83
 
Finally, in assessing the constitutionality of sex-based 
classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has 
expressed disapproval of classifications in general, considering any 
legislative classifications inherently suspect.
84
 This anti-classification 
approach has been described as encompassing the view that it is 
―inappropriate [for the state] to treat individuals differently on the 
basis of a particular normative view about race or sex.‖85 Scholars 
 
 78. E.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that the necessity of a mother being 
present at childbirth is a biological difference that warrants differential classification to meet the 
governmental ends of ensuring that citizen parents of out-of-wedlock children are their 
biological parents); General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (finding that lack of 
health coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities was not sex discrimination); Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (holding that a woman‘s ability to become pregnant is a 
constitutionally valid basis for classification because it is grounded in a biological difference 
between women and men). The Supreme Court had the opportunity to re-evaluate the ―real 
differences‖ principle through Flores-Villar v. United States, 564 U.S. __ (2011). Flores-Villar 
claimed that an immigration statute is unconstitutional because it relies on an impermissible sex 
classification that imposes more stringent residence requirements on United States citizen 
fathers than on mothers who wish to transmit citizenship to their children. The Supreme Court 
split 4–4, and affirmed the lower court‘s ruling.  
 79. See supra note 78.  
 80. See Sunstein, infra note 99 (arguing against existence of real differences).  
 81. See infra text accompanying notes 99–101 for scholars‘ perspectives on hierarchy and 
how it is supported through differentiating, even biologically.  
 82. See generally Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83 (2010).  
 83. See generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role Stereotyping 
from Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1095 (2009). 
 84. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
733–35 (2007) (holding that racial classifications in the public school non-higher-education 
context failed strict scrutiny standard and are generally disfavored).  
 85. Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986) [hereinafter Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All]; see also 
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or 
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 10 (2003) (―this principle holds that the 
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have suggested, however, that an anti-subordination approach that 
focuses on remedying structural inequality, rather than eliminating 
classifications, might better address more subtle disparities based on 
sex or race.
86
 Anti-subordination arguments focus on substantive 
rather than formal equality, finding it ―inappropriate for certain 
groups in society to have subordinated status because of their lack of 
power in society as a whole.‖87 The two approaches to inequality 
were articulated by scholars in an attempt to better understand how 
courts came to conceptualize equality in an anti-classification 
manner,
88
 and how courts could better address state-supported 
inequalities by embracing the goal of anti-subordination.
89
 These 
frameworks are discussed in greater depth in Part II below.  
II. CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY OF THE VACCINE MANDATES 
HPV vaccine mandates that apply to one sex only fail the equal 
protection guarantee. Laws involving classifications on the basis of 
sex must meet the intermediate scrutiny standard.
90
 HPV vaccine 
mandates differentiate between the category of individuals required 
to receive the vaccine, women, and the category of individuals under 
 
government may not classify people either overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden 
category: for example, their race‖); Ruth Colker, The Anti-Subordination Principle: 
Applications, 3 WIS. WOMEN‘S L.J. 59, 63–64 (1987) (―The evil is the differentiation rather 
than who is acted upon.‖).  
 86. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 170–71 (1976); Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All, supra note 85; see also infra Part 
II.C.1 for further development of these theories of equality.  
 87. See Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All, supra note 85, at 1007. Colker further 
elaborates on the principle:  
This approach seeks to eliminate the power disparities between men and women, and 
between whites and non-whites, through the development of laws and policies that 
directly redress those disparities. From an anti-subordination perspective, both facially 
differentiating and facially neutral policies are invidious only if they perpetuate racial 
or sexual hierarchy.  
Id. at 1007–08 (footnotes omitted).  
 88. The courts currently conceive of equality as color-blindness or gender-blindness, ideas 
that scholars identify as the anti-classification theory. See supra note 84; see also infra notes 
140–45 (providing summaries of the theory from the literature).  
 89. Scholars such as Owen Fiss, Ruth Colker, Reva Siegel, and Robin West argue that 
anti-subordination goals can better address inequality because it looks at systems rather than 
individuals. See infra notes 146–50.  
 90. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1967). 
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no such mandate, men.
91
 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the 
classification at issue here—mandating the vaccine for girls but not 
for boys—must serve an important governmental interest, be 
substantially related to achievement of that goal, and be supported by 
an exceedingly persuasive justification.
92
  
The strongest ―important governmental interest‖ of a girls-only 
HPV vaccine is a health- or welfare-based interest—ensuring that 
cancers caused by HPV are curtailed through prophylactic 
vaccination.
93
 To meet that interest, states have chosen to mandate 
vaccination for the population most at risk for getting cancer from 
HPV: girls and women.
94
 Whether that choice is substantially related 
to the achievement of the goal, or the state has provided an 
exceedingly persuasive justification for the choice to classify on the 
basis of sex, is debatable based on current case law and available 
public health information. When examined in the context of the 
available rationales and theories for intermediate scrutiny, however, a 
girls-only vaccine mandate cannot survive review.  
The application of intermediate scrutiny does not necessarily 
predict a result either way. In the modern sex-based classification 
cases, the Court has overturned roughly the same number of sex-
specific provisions as it has upheld.
95
 A few major principles drive 
these results: (1) the Supreme Court tends to justify sex-based 
classifications related to biological or ―real differences‖ between men 
and women, (2) in contrast, the Court is increasingly unwilling to rely 
 
 91. See supra Part I.B.1–3, discussing various forms of HPV vaccination mandates in the 
states that have them. All of the existing mandates only require vaccination of girls; none 
require vaccination of boys.  
 92. See supra notes 74–75 and accompanying text for cases articulating the standard.  
 93. See supra notes 44, 49. The Texas and Washington D.C. laws both included findings 
that expressed that the statutes‘ purpose for requiring vaccination was to prevent HPV in girls, 
thereby reducing cancer burdens. While the scope of the governmental interest could be 
narrowed to only include curtailing cervical cancer, the vaccines have been shown to be 
effective at preventing HPV in men. See Giuliano et al., supra note 39, and accompanying text. 
For the purposes of the intermediate scrutiny analysis in this Note, because the vaccine is 
capable of preventing many forms of cancer, all of those forms are targeted.  
 94. See supra notes 46, 49, and 54. Virginia, Texas, and Washington D.C. all have 
gender-discriminatory mandates.  
 95. See CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN ET AL., FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 81–86 tbl. (4th ed. 2010) (noting that in the cases challenging sex discriminatory 
state action on equal protection grounds, sixteen provisions were invalidated, while thirteen 
were upheld).  
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on sex stereotypes to uphold sex classifications, (3) indeed, the 
current Court seems to disfavor most classifications, believing they 
are unjustified because they are rooted in stereotypes, and (4) 
scholars increasingly call on the Court to take an anti-subordination 
approach as opposed to an anti-classification approach.
96
  
A. “Real Differences” 
In cases concerning pregnancy and parentage, the Supreme Court 
has held that ―real differences‖ between men and women justify 
differential classification and treatment of the sexes in state and 
federal law.
97
 The biology of pregnancy, in which only individuals 
with uteruses—women—give birth, seems to be the type of 
―difference‖ that the Court is willing to permit as an acceptable use of 
classification.
98
  
Scholars, however, have argued against the conceptualization and 
use of real differences to justify sex-based classification. They 
question both the types of differences that fall within the category of 
―real differences‖ and the fundamental notion of differences 
themselves, disputing the foundations of the normative prescriptions 
that the Supreme Court has made in distinguishing biological 
differences from other classifications. Cass Sunstein has suggested 
that many ―real differences‖ are merely byproducts of structural 
inequality, and as such, should not be proffered as justification for 
 
 96. See supra notes 78–89 and accompanying text.  
 97. See, e.g., Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 61–63 (2001) (upholding a statute with a sex-
based classification distinguishing between a parent who gives birth and parent who does not 
give birth because of the biological difference between mothers and fathers at the time of birth); 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1974) (upholding sex-based classification of 
pregnant and non-pregnant persons because it is grounded in the fact that only women are 
included in the former category, and both men and women are in the latter). But see Nev. Dep‘t 
of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 735 (2003) (holding the Family and Medical Leave Act 
constitutional in spite of gender neutral pregnancy leave because states had history of 
perpetuating gender discrimination in administration of leave benefits); Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass‘n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987) (upholding a California employment benefits statute that 
gave pregnant women qualified reinstatement, in spite of challenges arguing that the statute 
gave preferential treatment to women in a sex-discriminatory fashion). 
 98. See SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, ELUSIVE EQUALITY: WOMEN‘S RIGHTS, PUBLIC POLICY, 
AND THE LAW 32 (2003) (―Although many had assumed constitutional sex equality had been 
attained, the high court‘s most recent decisions indicate that biological sex differences remain 
an acceptable justification for laws in the United States.‖).  
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differential treatment.
99
 Zillah Eisenstein builds on this 
conceptualization, asserting that for a female body, ―being ‗different‘ 
is the same as being unequal.‖100 Martha Minow describes the danger 
of differentiation as follows: ―[A] difference assigned by someone 
with power over a more vulnerable person will become endowed with 
an apparent reality, despite powerful competing views.‖101 These 
scholars‘ arguments undermine the rigid nature of ―real differences‖ 
and open space for dialogue about which ―differences‖ warrant 
different treatment.  
The concept of ―real differences‖ can be used to support or thwart 
sex-based classifications in HPV vaccine mandates. On one hand, 
one could claim that the HPV vaccine mandates are analogous to the 
―real differences‖ inherent in pregnancy because only women can 
contract cervical cancer. Legislators and others focus on cervical 
 
 99. While the overall chapter discusses homosexuality and the Constitution more broadly, 
this particular section cited to questions whether women are truly different from men, and 
whether it matters if they are. Sunstein argues:  
Differences between men and women—especially those involving sexuality and 
reproduction—are often said to explain sex inequality, indeed to be the origin of 
inequality. But it might be better to think that at least some such differences are an 
outcome of inequality, or its product. . . . I suggest only that many of the sex 
differences that are said to justify inequality—physical, psychological, and more—are 
really a product of inequality. . . . [W]e know enough to suggest that nature is not 
responsible for anything like all of what we see.  
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, in SEX, PREFERENCE, AND FAMILY 217–
19 (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997). Sunstein suggests that sex inequality 
can be better addressed by constitutional jurisprudence as a matter of dismantling a gender-
based caste system instead of permitting the system to continue because of alleged differences. 
Id. at 219.  
 100. ZILLAH EISENSTEIN, THE FEMALE BODY AND THE LAW 79 (1988). Eisenstein finds 
sex difference particularly problematic because ―[t]he woman‘s body . . . is inevitably 
associated with the mother‘s body, which is more than female because it embodies 
institutionalized gender ‗difference.‘‖ Id. at 80. She further argues that:  
Sex is the realm of biological raw material, and gender reflects human social 
intervention. But we need to recognize that even what is thought of as raw biology is 
socially constructed. This ambiguity makes it difficult to distinguish between the 
institutionalized notions of gender and their nongendered components because the two 
are never completely separate. This is true of the distinctions between woman‘s 
biological particularity and her sex ―difference‖: between the pregnant body and the 
woman‘s body and between the institution of motherhood and biological motherhood.  
Id. at 81.  
 101. Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 217 (Patricia Smith 
ed., 1993). 
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cancer as the perceived sole consequence of HPV.
102
 Since cervical 
cancer is the type of cancer that is most commonly caused by HPV,
103
 
the use of biological difference—only women have cervixes—can be 
a permissible sex-based classification analogous to the biological 
difference of pregnancy. As such, laws using such classifications may 
be upheld on these grounds.  
On the other hand, relying on ―real differences‖ leads to a highly 
under-inclusive result. The biological difference of having a cervix is 
neither predictive of all of the adverse effects of HPV, nor of the 
benefits of the HPV vaccine. Men can develop a number of cancers 
from HPV;
104
 they also transmit the virus to other men and to 
women.
105
 HPV adversely affects both men and women because they 
are both at risk of transmitting the virus and developing cancer from 
it, so mandating the vaccine in a sex-discriminatory fashion is 
unwarranted. Studies show that as currently conceived, gender-
discriminatory HPV vaccine mandates are less effective at protecting 
women against HPV-induced cervical cancers than if the vaccine 
were made mandatory for all individuals.
106
 In addition, women-only 
mandates completely leave out the risks posed to men who have sex 
with men.  
Therefore, if the goal of state legislatures is to eradicate the 
cancers caused by HPV, then the most effective means possible is a 
gender-neutral mandate. Sunstein‘s assessment regarding inequality, 
that ―real differences‖ are byproducts of structural inequality,107 is 
reflected in the perceived ―real difference‖ of having a cervix as a 
 
 102. See supra Part I.B for language of HPV vaccination mandates emphasizing cervical 
cancer as a consequence of HPV to the exclusion of the many other possible negative effects.  
 103. See Parkin & Bray, supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 104. See HPV-Associated Cancer Statistics, supra note 1. 
 105. See Burchell et al., supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the transmission 
of HPV).  
 106. See V. Brown & K.A.J. White, The HPV Vaccination Strategy: Could Male 
Vaccination Have a Significant Impact?, 11 COMPUTATIONAL & MATHEMATICAL METHODS 
MED. 223 (2010). Brown and White find in their study that including males in the vaccination 
process allows ―eradication of infection possible for a wider range of parameter values,‖ or 
increases the chance of infection eradication under a greater variety of conditions. Id. at 228–
30. They also calculate that including males in vaccination programs ―actually leads to a slight 
decrease in the total prevalence of infection at steady state.‖ Id. at 232; see also Mandatory 
HPV Vaccines, supra note 21.  
 107. See Sunstein, supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
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justification for differential treatment. In drawing distinctions 
between men and women, especially in the context of biology, men 
have traditionally used sex stereotypes about gender roles to retain 
their superior status, regardless of whether it is warranted or not. 
Here, having a penis is correlative of sexual agency and pleasure, 
while having a cervix requires protection and paternalistic measures 
such as vaccination.
108
 The differentiation is also unwarranted and 
particularly dangerous because it disparately impacts the poor and 
those with restricted access to the HPV vaccine, since school-based 
vaccine mandates have been found to ensure greater immunization in 
the population more broadly.
109
 This is problematic, even if the 
Constitution does not protect class-based disparate impacts. Even 
under existing approaches to ―real differences‖ then, vaccine 
mandates should be extended to young men if they have already been 
imposed on young women.  
B. Sex Stereotypes 
Unlike ―real differences,‖ sex stereotypes have been identified as 
impermissible bases for making sex-based classifications to further 
government ends.
110
 The Supreme Court has established that it will 
not use outmoded sex stereotypes as a justification for upholding sex-
based classifications,
111
 and commentators agree that the Court has 
 
 108. See infra Part II.B (discussing sex stereotypes regarding sexuality).  
 109. See supra note 7 for sources describing background and rationales behind school 
vaccine mandates. See Bach, supra note 26, at 963 for statistics on how those of low 
socioeconomic status have the lowest HPV vaccination levels.  
 110. The Court stated: ―[W]omen still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, 
discrimination in our educational institutions, in the job market and, perhaps most 
conspicuously, in the political arena.‖ Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) 
(citations omitted). It has also found that based on data before Congress at the time the Family 
& Medical Leave Act was passed, ―States continue[d] to rely on invalid gender stereotypes in 
the employment context, specifically in the administration of leave benefits,‖ which provided a 
justification for upholding the statute, because its provisions attempted to address those invalid 
gender stereotypes. Nev. Dep‘t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003).  
 111. In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the Court, in discussing impermissible 
sex stereotypes, stated: ―[T]he test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification 
. . . must be applied free of fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males and 
females. Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects 
archaic and stereotypic notions.‖ Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724–25 
(1982). The Court in VMI stated that: ―[the government] must not rely on overbroad 
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taken an anti-stereotyping approach to cases involving equal 
protection challenges of sex classifications.
112
 Moreover, in Nevada 
Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court upheld the 
Family & Medical Leave Act because it was enacted to counter 
impermissible stereotyping, finding the anti-stereotyping rationale to 
be a valid basis for justifying the legislation.
113
  
Sex stereotyping is particularly threatening because it relies on 
societal assumptions not grounded in fact.
114
 In addition, sex 
stereotypes do not stand in isolation of racialized, class-formulated 
assumptions but instead are interwoven within them.
115
 Scholars such 
as Cary Franklin argue that the principle of anti-stereotyping applies 
regardless of ―whether . . . ‗real‘ differences are involved.‖116 
Franklin identifies the origins of the principle in the ―real 
differences,‖ cases themselves, which classified some differences as 
real in an attempt to distinguish them from differences rooted in 
stereotypes. Over time, however, the Court began using anti-
stereotyping principles to limit the scope of exceptions created by 
―real differences.‖117 
 
generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.‖ 
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (citing Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 
636, 643, 648 (1975); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223–24 (1977)).  
 112. See Franklin, supra note 82.  
 113. Nev. Dep‘t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 US 721, 734 (2003) (―Congress could 
reasonably conclude that [existing] discretionary family-leave programs would do little to 
combat the stereotypes about the roles of male and female employees that Congress sought to 
eliminate.‖).  
 114. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 214 (1976) (denouncing the use of unthinking 
stereotypes to support sex-based classifications).  
 115. See, e.g., Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 581, 585 (1990) (Gender essentialism results in ―some voices . . . silenced in order to 
privilege others.‖); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 
BERKELEY WOMEN‘S L.J. 191, 209 (1989) (―The problem with current feminist theory is that 
the more abstract and universal it is, the more it fails to relate to the lived reality of many 
women.‖). In particular, Trina Grillo questions why ―woman unmodified‖ necessarily 
implicates the stereotypical, assumed ―white, middle class‖ woman. Trina Grillo, Anti-
Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House, 10 BERKELEY 
WOMEN‘S L.J. 16, 19, 21 (1995).  
 116. See Franklin, supra note 82, at 146. 
 117. Id. Franklin goes as far as to say that ―the Court‘s opinion suggests that equal 
protection law should be particularly alert to the possibility of sex stereotyping in contexts 
where ‗real‘ differences are involved, because these are the contexts in which sex classifications 
have most often been used to perpetuate sex-based inequality.‖ Id. 
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Gendered HPV vaccine mandates rest on stereotypes concerning 
the appropriate sexual roles of men and women. These stereotypes 
are similar to the protectionist stereotypes attaching to pregnancy. 
States‘ historical treatment of pregnancy was a bastion of sex-role 
stereotyping.
118
 Differential treatment because of pregnancy was 
justified by the notion of separate spheres,
119
 in which women 
warranted ―protection‖ because they were expected to perform the 
role of economically dependent caretakers.
120
 Such pregnancy-related 
stereotyping remained permissible until Congress passed the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA).
121
  
Recently, scholars have claimed that the Supreme Court has 
challenged such stereotyping. These scholars view Hibbs,
122
 Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
123
 and Justice 
Ginsburg‘s dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart124 as affirmation of how 
―even though the Court initially had difficulty seeing that sex role 
stereotypes were sometimes implicated in cases concerning the 
 
 118. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 83, at 1097–98 nn.13–15. The authors discuss how in 
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974); 
and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Supreme Court assumes that pregnancy is a 
fundamental sex difference warranting differential treatment and thus ―[t]he cases do not 
seriously explore the possibility that traditional sex-role stereotyping shapes judgments about 
functional rationality or altruism where matters of pregnancy are concerned.‖ Id. at 1098.  
 119. See NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 210 (1987) (―Private 
employers discriminating against married women typically reasoned that wives, by definition, 
did not need to work because their husbands were legally bound to support them. That 
understanding came . . . from the longstanding economic concept of marriage itself—enshrined 
in common law and custom—requiring the husband‘s support and the wife‘s service to him.‖).  
 120. Martha Minow describes the inherent dilemma raised by pregnancy as sex role 
stereotyping: ―[T]he issue of stereotypes was unavoidable: The dilemma in [Cal. Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Ass‘n. v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987)] . . . was whether women could secure a benefit 
that would eliminate a burden connected with their gender, without at the same time 
reactivating negative meanings about their gender.‖ See Minow, supra note 101, at 221. Wendy 
Williams also makes a compelling argument for the equality approach, rather than the ―special 
treatment‖ one. See Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections On Culture, 
Courts, and Feminism, 14 WOMEN‘S RTS. L. REP. 151, 170 (1992). Williams describes the 
detrimental costs of the special treatment approach, including (1) permitting both favorable and 
unfavorable treatment of pregnancy, (2) increasing political division in advocating for change, 
(3) the double-edged sword nature of protectionist legislation, and (4) giving the state too much 
sway in women‘s ―procreational capabilities.‖ Id. at 170. 
 121. Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA) of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 
(codified as amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2011)).  
 122. Nev. Dep‘t of Hum. Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003). 
 123. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).  
 124. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
314 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:289 
 
 
regulation of pregnancy, the Court‘s constitutional decisions have 
increasingly come to recognize the relationship between pregnancy 
discrimination and sex discrimination.‖125  
It is not surprising that similar stereotypes may arise in the context 
of gendered HPV vaccines. Just as pregnancy affects only women‘s 
bodies, HPV is assumed by these mandates to have a much larger 
impact on women than on men.
126
 Similarly, pregnancy is generally 
caused by contact with male genitalia,
127
 and HPV is largely 
transmitted through such contact.
128
 Finally, both pregnancy and HPV 
have been targeted as ―real differences‖ warranting classification and 
differential treatment.
129
 These similarities in turn inspire similar 
stereotypes, namely that girls need more protection from HPV than 
boys because of the risk of cervical cancer and that girls alone should 
be responsible for such protection. Gendered HPV mandates rest on 
these stereotypes. Like past laws assuming that women should be 
solely responsible for pregnancy despite men‘s role in pregnancy, 
gendered HPV mandates assume that women alone are responsible 
for contracting communicable sexually transmitted infections,
130
 
blatantly ignoring the primary means of transmission of HPV to 
women, namely genital contact with men.
131
  
Just as pregnancy stereotyping has come to be viewed as 
impermissible sex discrimination, so should these stereotypes. Both 
stereotypes are equally impermissible because they are based on 
outmoded perceptions of the roles of women in society. By only 
requiring female vaccination, girls and women are likewise held 
responsible for preventing contraction of HPV, regardless of the fact 
that they most likely will contract it from boys and men. While 
 
 125. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 83, at 1098. The authors argue that in each of these 
cases, the Court applies an anti-stereotyping approach to explain why it upholds provisions that 
attempt to diminish pregnancy discrimination.  
 126. See, e.g., supra notes 19, 20, and 35 for examples that focus on HPV in women.  
 127. While there are some pregnancies that do not require such contact, such as those that 
involve assisted reproduction, the vast majority of pregnancies still occur as a result of vaginal 
intercourse.  
 128. See Burchell et al., supra note 14.  
 129. See supra text accompanying notes 97–98, 102–03 for pregnancy ―real differences‖ 
cases and HPV vaccination requirements classifying on basis of sex. 
 130. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 131. See Burchell et al., supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
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gendered vaccination mandates are not subject to explicit anti-
discrimination legislation like the PDA, the law can draw analogues 
between pregnancy and HPV vaccination to require gender-neutral 
mandates instead of reinvigorating stereotypes that the Supreme 
Court has attempted to dismantle. 
Moreover, by tying public school attendance to HPV vaccination, 
the mandates necessarily mean that states are communicating through 
the policies surrounding the vaccine. The presence of a vaccine 
mandate for girls and not boys signals to students that women are 
responsible for contracting HPV, while men bear no responsibility for 
contracting or transmitting it. By not mandating vaccination for boys, 
schools are reinforcing the stereotype that the sex acts of men have 
fewer consequences and are less normatively proscribed than those of 
women.
132
 The implication is that boys need not be vaccinated 
because they neither experience any effects from contracting HPV 
nor perform any role in transmitting it. When such stereotyping is 
inculcated through the school system, it becomes coterminous with 
students‘ education more generally—learning ―proper sex roles‖ is 
given the same normative valence as mastering algebra.
133
 Legislators 
should be exceedingly cautious when relying upon such stereotypes 
to justify their educationally-based sex-discriminatory vaccine 
 
 132. See NACK, supra note 18, at 6 (―Most Americans subscribe to a gender ideology in 
which girls and women are morally and socially demeaned by non-marital sexual encounters, 
whereas these same behaviors serve to elevate the social statuses of boys and men.‖).  
 133. Adolescent sex education is another school-based source of communicating sex 
stereotyping. Sex stereotyping in the context of adolescent sex education is particularly delicate 
because of the immense influence that schools have in their students‘ psychosocial 
development, and perceptions of sexuality and their gender roles within it. In an analysis of sex 
education in schools, Jennifer Hendricks and Dawn Howerton note that a large proportion of 
sex education curricula involve pervasive sex stereotypes that link sexual activity to 
―motherhood . . . and paternal financial obligation,‖ which ―teaches teens to associate sex with 
traditional gender roles,‖ and also that the curricula emphasize ―associations between sex and 
fear.‖ Jennifer S. Hendricks & Dawn Marie Howerton, Teaching Values, Teaching Stereotypes: 
Sex Ed and Indoctrination in Public Schools, 13 U. PA. CONST. L. 587, 603 (2011). The authors 
call for an end to normative privileging of sex stereotypes and traditional sex roles as conveyed 
through sex education curricula. Id. at 592. Hendricks and Howerton argue, however, that the 
best way to address gendered and sex stereotyping sex education is through the First 
Amendment, and not the Equal Protection Clause because they perceive First Amendment 
doctrine to be more sensitive to eliminating government imposition of values. Id. at 626.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
316 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 38:289 
 
 
policies because youth rarely have the opportunity to challenge such 
policies.
134
 
Such stereotypes are particularly troubling because they apply 
without regard to race or class, which are both correlative of 
differential impact of HPV.
135
 Empirical research shows that Black 
and Hispanic women, as well as women in poverty, tend to be 
affected by HPV at greater rates than those not in these categories.
136
 
Yet the stereotypes assume that all women are affected by HPV in the 
exact same way. As a result, the populations that most need 
vaccination and have limited access to treatment for cancers related 
to HPV
137
 are, based on outmoded perceptions of proper sex roles, 
having their access to prophylactic vaccination limited. While the 
limited access could be attributed to implicit racial bias,
138
 it is more 
likely that low socio-economic status is the primary limitation for 
these populations. The limitations are merely compounded by 
restricting mandatory vaccination to women.  
Anti-essentialist scholars such as Angela P. Harris argue against 
such gender-essentialism, claiming that feminists ―should challenge 
not only law‘s content but its tendency to privilege the abstract and 
unitary voice.‖139 It is tempting to essentialize all women and then 
single out poor women and women of color as in need of ―increased‖ 
protection. Yet, such women are not merely like all women but more 
so. Instead, transmission can vary according to race, class, and 
sexuality, among other factors. While increasing health care 
accessibility to particular groups might be helpful, it does not alone 
sufficiently curtail the risk of intra- or inter- group transmission of 
 
 134. Sex stereotyping that involves youth is particularly troubling. Youth have a limited 
opportunity to counter the systemic inequality they face through the stereotyping because their 
access to courts is limited. There are, of course, always lawsuits filed by parents on behalf of 
their children challenging educational policies, id. at 28 (citing Montiero v. Temple Union High 
Sch. Dist., 138 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 1998)), but those types of lawsuits presume that parents also 
oppose the policy at issue.  
 135. See supra notes 5–6. These sources describe how poverty, being Black, or being 
Hispanic are all correlative of worse HPV-related outcomes.  
 136. See supra notes 5–6. 
 137. Bach, supra note 26, at 963.  
 138. See generally Charles Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning 
with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987) (arguing that racism and racial bias is 
unconscious).  
 139. Harris, supra note 115, at 585.  
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HPV. Indeed, viewing races, genders, sexual orientations, and other 
categorizations in isolation is problematic because these groups 
intermingle sexually and otherwise. Anti-essentialism would 
therefore call for HPV mandates to address the needs of all sexes, 
races, and classes to better protect individuals against the unique 
subordination that might be overlooked by measuring everyone in 
relation to one stereotyped and privileged norm.  
C. Anti-Classification and Anti-Subordination Approaches 
Traditionally, the ―real differences‖ and anti-stereotyping 
approaches were means to distinguish permissible distinctions 
between the sexes from impermissible ones. Both were thus seen as 
embodying an anti-classification approach, in which sex-based 
classifications were generally discouraged absent appropriate 
justifications. Scholars began to address some of the limitations of 
this anti-classification approach by considering how subordination 
may linger even when state laws appear sex- or race-neutral. In time, 
many scholars came to believe that an anti-subordination approach 
was superior to an anti-classification approach because it better 
challenged the ways existing structures privileged certain groups to 
the exclusion of others, even in the absence of facially discriminatory 
laws.   
In the context of HPV mandates, the two approaches dovetail 
neatly to point to the same result: extending vaccination mandates to 
both sexes. Indeed, although many scholars see the two approaches as 
divergent means of achieving equality, the HPV vaccine context 
provides an opportunity to examine some of the overlapping features 
of each theory of equality.  
1. Two Theories of Equality  
Anti-classification
140
 opposes explicit differences in treatment on 
the basis of race or sex regardless of the reasons behind those 
 
 140. Anti-classification is also sometimes referred to as anti-differentiation, or anti-
discrimination in the literature. 
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differences.
141
 In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1,
142
 the Court refused to uphold a race-based 
classification to accomplish affirmative action in public school 
districting on the grounds that racial classifications are inherently 
suspect. The Court stated: ―This Court has recently reiterated . . . that 
‗all racial classifications [imposed by the state] . . . must be analyzed 
by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.‘‖143 The Court found the 
provisions invalid, relying on Rice v. Cayetano, in which it declared: 
―‗[o]ne of the principal reasons race is treated as a forbidden 
classification is that it demeans the dignity and worth of a person to 
be judged by ancestry instead of by his or her own merit and essential 
qualities.‘‖144 Commentators are quick to point to the inadequacies of 
anti-classification when it is used as a rationale for striking down 
laws like affirmative action that benefit protected classes.
145
  
Anti-subordination,
146
 in contrast, is defined by its goal of 
dismantling inequality through multiple means.
147
 While the Court 
has not formally recognized the theory in the context of equal 
 
 141. See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 142. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).  
 143. Id. at 741 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).  
 144. Id. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 517 (2000)).  
 145. Reva Siegel finds that ―[t]he fundamentality of the anticlassification principle . . . 
explains various features of our equal protection tradition, foremost among them its 
commitment to protect individuals against all forms of racial classification, including ‗benign‘ 
or ‗reverse‘ discrimination.‖ Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 
1473 (2004). Siegel argues that anti-classification as a governing principle has been used in 
conflicting ways in the past, and its history and precedential value is less straightforward than 
the Court suggests.  
The record suggests that, at some points in our history, courts have employed claims 
about the wrongs of racial classification to express and to mask constitutional concerns 
about practices that enforce second-class citizenship for members of relatively 
powerless social groups—and at other points in our history, courts have employed 
claims about the wrongs of racial classification to block, diffuse, and limit 
constitutional expression of such concerns. The debates over Brown‘s implementation 
show the complex ways in which concerns about legitimacy have moved courts to 
mask and to limit a constitutional regime that would intervene in the affairs of the 
powerful on behalf of the powerless.  
Id. 
 146. Anti-subordination is also sometimes referred to as the group-disadvantaging principle 
in the literature.  
 147. See supra note 87. 
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protection jurisprudence, scholars have developed the theory to 
articulate means that better address and remedy structural 
inequality.
148
 In the context of sex discrimination, Robin West 
defines anti-subordination as determining ―not whether the legislative 
classification ‗fits‘ a pre-existing reality, but rather whether the 
classification furthers the subordination of women vis-à-vis men or 
attempts to end their subordination.‖149 Under this theory, ―Sex-based 
state action offends the Equal Protection Clause in those 
circumstances where it perpetuates the status inferiority of 
women.‖150  
2. Reconciling the Theories in the Context of the HPV Vaccine 
While most constitutional scholars argue that the Equal Protection 
Clause should be approached pursuant to either anti-classification or 
anti-subordination rationales, the choice between the two theories 
need not be irreconcilable.
151
 Owen Fiss argues that different types of 
 
 148. Proponents of anti-classification claim that the legacy and original intent of Brown v. 
Board of Education of Topeka, Shawnee County, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), which held that 
―in the field of education, the doctrine of ‗separate but equal‘ has no place,‖ id. at 495, was that 
racial equality would be achieved through equal protection on an individualized level by 
removing classifications and through a colorblind Constitution. More recently, scholars have 
shown that Brown‘s intent was instead to work against subordination more broadly of African 
Americans. Reva Siegel argues, ―the anticlassification principle was not the ground of the 
Brown decision but instead emerged from struggles over the decision's enforcement.‖ Siegel, 
supra note 145, at 1547. Through her research, Siegel finds that the decision actually ―teaches 
that concerns about group subordination are at the heart of the modern equal protection 
tradition—and, at the same time, suggests important reasons why such concerns have been 
persistently disguised, qualified, and bounded.‖ Id. at 1547. 
 149. Robin L. West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 60 (1990). West distinguishes anti-subordination from other 
models:  
In sharp contrast to the rationality model, the antisubordination model rests not on a 
universalist vision of our ―shared‖ human nature, but on a political vision of our 
present unequal social reality. For constitutional purposes, the relevant issue is 
decidedly not that women are ―the same‖ as men but are treated differently or that 
women are different from men and are treated the same. . . .Thus, the aim of the equal 
protection clause should be to highlight and rectify that political reality and not to 
highlight and mirror similarities or differences between men and women. 
Id. at 61 (footnotes omitted). 
 150. Reva B. Siegel, Gender and the United States Constitution, in THE GENDER OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 306, 317 (Beverley Baines & Ruth Rabio-Marin eds., 2005).  
 151. Ruth Colker argues, ―the courts have made their choices between the anti-
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discrimination call for different, tailored balances of anti-
classification and anti-subordination approaches.
152
 Jack Balkin and 
Reva Siegel, responding to Fiss, claim that ―the scope of the two 
principles overlap [and] their application shifts over time in response 
to social construction and social struggle.‖153 Because anti-
classification can be seen as a means of achieving anti-subordination 
goals in situations where the act of classifying is the cause of 
subordination, there exist ways to achieve structural equality even 
when the focus remains on the harms of classification to individuals.  
Vaccination mandate classifications exist to achieve a 
governmental end, eliminating cervical cancer, by targeting a 
particular group, women.
154
 Given the explicit sex-based 
classification, the Court is likely to be inherently suspicious of the 
means of achieving the government‘s interest under standard anti-
classification rationales. Here, unlike in Parents Involved, the 
classification will be examined under intermediate scrutiny instead of 
strict scrutiny, but like in Parents Involved, the classification should 
not withstand scrutiny.  
As discussed above, the general question in sex classification 
cases is whether the classification is grounded in real differences or 
stereotypes; if the former, it will be found invalid and, if the latter, 
the real differences will be examined to determine if they are in fact 
impermissible stereotypes. One way of rooting out such stereotypes is 
considering whether the classification at issue is in fact necessary to 
achieving the state‘s ends. In the case of gendered HPV mandates,155 
the stated purpose is to reduce the incidence of cervical cancer and 
HPV. This purpose presumes that the most effective way of 
 
differentiation and anti-subordination perspectives without a sound theoretical basis. The anti-
differentiation perspective developed pragmatically as a means of redressing subordination, 
rather than as a theoretical response to the core problem with race or sex discrimination—
differentiation or subordination.‖ Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All, supra note 85, at 1013.  
 152. Fiss, supra note 86, at 170–71. Fiss describes first order discrimination as explicit 
discrimination, such as exclusion of Blacks from public places. Second order discrimination is 
more subtle, including nondiscriminatory state action or facially ―neutral‖ criteria. He 
designates affirmative action programs and other preferential treatment third order 
discrimination.  
 153. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 85, at 10.  
 154. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra Part I.B and accompanying text and notes for discussion of the statutory 
language used in the vaccination mandates at issue.  
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diminishing the rate of cervical cancer is by vaccinating only women 
against HPV.  
Such a presumption carries some of the same dangers that flow 
from race-based classifications. The Court has pointed to the 
damaging assumptions behind race-based classifications,
156
 and those 
same concerns are inherent in gendered vaccination mandates. Here, 
the sex-discriminatory assumptions include that (1) HPV affects only 
women, (2) women alone are responsible for contracting HPV, and 
(3) the burden of the consequences of HPV should lie solely on 
women. Each of these assumptions is detrimental to women because 
they reinforce negative stereotypes regarding women‘s sexuality, 
contributing to and reinforcing their inferior status in society.
157
 
Therefore, under standard anti-classification approaches, existing 
HPV mandates should be rendered gender-neutral.  
Moreover, in this context, unlike in Parents Involved, gender-
neutrality does not freeze in place existing power dynamics. Anti-
subordination approaches seek to ensure that women as a group do 
not continue to be subjugated through existing structures even if 
those structures are facially gender-blind. Here, gender-neutrality 
actually challenges underlying forms of gender discrimination by 
dismantling assumptions about the appropriate sexual roles of men 
and women. Challenging the gendered stereotypes attaching to 
sexuality does more than help nonconforming individuals. Instead, 
such a challenge also has the potential to alter the structure of sexual 
interactions.  
In supporting gender-neutral mandates, therefore, anti-
classification and anti-subordination approaches to equality are not at 
odds. Both the individual-focused anti-classification theory and the 
group-focused anti-subordination theory support a gender-neutral 
mandate. This integration of theories begs the question of what other 
types of gender classifications might similarly benefit from such an 
integrated analysis.
158
  
 
 156. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 746 (2007). 
 157. See supra Part II.B and accompanying text and notes for discussion of dangers of sex 
stereotyping in the context of HPV vaccination mandates.  
 158. Serena Mayeri suggests reconstructing the analogy between race and sex so that 
affirmative action programs in either context have a greater chance of surviving scrutiny, 
ostensibly under intermediate scrutiny. Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 
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III. NEXT STEPS: PROPOSALS 
In light of the forgoing equal protection analysis, some proposals 
for addressing the issues raised by gendered HPV vaccine mandates 
may seem obvious. However, the analysis also can be applied more 
broadly to address gendered aspects of the sex education context, 
thereby combating sex discrimination on a more macroscopic level.  
A. Mandate Gender-Neutral Vaccination 
If HPV mandates directed solely at girls are challenged, it seems 
unlikely that they will withstand constitutional scrutiny for the 
reasons stated above. Given the constitutional landscape, states have 
two options: (1) make their mandates gender-neutral, or (2) eliminate 
mandates altogether. Because the latter would defeat public health 
goals, this proposal focuses on the former.
159
  
If public health efficacy is the primary concern of lawmakers and 
administrators, they should opt to create gender-neutral mandates. 
When state legislatures consider vaccination schedules for school 
entrance, they should rely on concrete scientific evidence and not on 
outmoded gender stereotypes as the basis for the laws that protect 
their constituents.
160
 They should not focus merely on those who are 
perceived to be at increased risk, but ensure maximal coverage to 
target the virus from all possible angles.
161
  
 
49 WM. & MARY L. REV 1789 (2008). Her argument is grounded in the history of how race and 
sex came to be analogized; I argue here that equal protection might gain more bite if theorists 
and practitioners harnessed both anti-classification and anti-subordination rationales to achieve 
their gender justice goals.  
 159. While it is true that if the sex discriminatory vaccination mandates are contested and 
found unconstitutional, institutional inertia might convince states that promoting school-based 
vaccination is no longer worth the expenditure of their resources. Based on the statistics on the 
prevalence of HPV in the United States and the ready availability of the drug, states are likely 
to continue to consider a gender-neutral HPV vaccination mandate.  
 160. While many states have considered a vaccine mandate, few have enacted statutes 
requiring vaccination for girls as a condition for entry into public school, in part because of a 
reluctance to address sexually transmitted infections. Legislators fear backlash from 
constituents who may promote abstinence-only education and who believe that their daughters 
are sexually inactive. These legislators may then enact statutes according to outmoded sex 
stereotypes regarding female sexuality, rather than with the purpose of protecting girls from a 
preventable disease.  
 161. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  
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B. Increase Research Support 
There is a shortfall of knowledge about the costs and benefits of 
the HPV vaccine for men. Although some studies have found that the 
vaccine is effective at preventing HPV-related cancers in men,
162
 and 
it has been widely postulated that immunization against strains of 
HPV will curtail transmission of HPV,
163
 it is essential to obtain 
additional research support and findings so that ACIP and other 
regulatory and policymaking bodies can make scientifically backed 
recommendations. Although both men and women are affected by 
HPV, they are not affected in the same ways. Thus it would be 
beneficial to have more empirical research to better explain how men 
might benefit from the vaccine.  
C. Use Sex Education as a Vehicle for Addressing Sex Discrimination 
Sex education provides a vehicle for addressing many of the 
broader issues that sex discriminatory HPV vaccine mandates raise. 
Making changes in sex education policies, such as removing 
normative prescriptions about the proper sexual roles of men and 
women, would meet anti-classification goals by distributing 
responsibility for sex to all parties, instead of differentially to men 
and women.
164
 States can confront the problem from a systemic anti-
subordination perspective by addressing sex classifications, and the 
broader policies in which they fit.  
For example, as a policy matter, states can require that sex 
education rely on evidence-based empirical research in order to avoid 
normative prescriptions regarding sex roles. When states require 
curricula that focus on the science of sexually transmitted infections, 
sex education can be a means to address sex inequalities. This way, 
students will have better understandings of how different sexually 
transmitted infections are actually transmitted,
165
 helping them to 
 
 162. See Giuliano et al., supra note 39, at 409.  
 163. See Kim, supra note 41, at 394.  
 164. See generally Hendricks & Howerton, supra note 133 (arguing that sex education 
needs to prescribe fewer stereotypes as normative values).  
 165. Condoms are not entirely effective at preventing HPV, but do protect against a variety 
of other sexually transmitted infections, as well as pregnancy. See supra note 18 and 
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combat misguided assumptions about the role of men and women in 
managing sexual activity and its consequences. A provision 
providing for increasing information is especially important in light 
of the fact that those in a position lacking privilege are unlikely to be 
able to access the information on their own.
166
 As mentioned, 
students lack the political power to alter their positions.
167
 States must 
also more broadly address HPV within the context of other sexually 
transmitted infections, and educate students that even though 
vaccinated students may have immunity against HPV, they can still 
contract other sexually transmitted infections.
168
  
CONCLUSION 
This Note calls into question the constitutionality and efficacy of 
existing gender-discriminatory HPV vaccine mandates. This 
preliminary analysis reveals that the vaccination mandates are 
unconstitutional because they are rooted in outmoded stereotypes 
about the role of women in managing sexual activity and sexually 
transmitted infections. In addition, these stereotypes are dangerous 
because they impede the public health goal of eradicating HPV, 
reinforce gender role oppression, and maintain hierarchical health-
care disparities based on race and class. If lawmakers, public health 
officials, and scholars want to address HPV more comprehensively 
and effectively, they should look to anti-classification means to meet 
anti-subordination goals.  
 
accompanying text (describing condom effectiveness at preventing HPV).  
 166. See Grillo, supra note 115, at 27 (―those of us who are middle-class, or members of 
otherwise privileged elites, can be used as unwitting perpetuators of the subordination of 
others‖) (citing Regina Austin, Sapphire Bound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539, 554).  
 167. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 168. The HPV vaccine only covers, as one would expect, HPV. Other sexually transmitted 
infections are unaffected by the vaccine, and students should be made aware of that fact so that 
they can take adequate precautions, even if post-vaccination they no longer have to worry about 
contracting HPV.  
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